

PFEIFER ,
XO

2/01/01

XO - 15 Months

Lunch ended later than scheduled, Told CO after MS's prepped ready for angles. Went to control talked with DVs. At 1306 XO went to CO and told him 54 minutes to PH we needed to get going. CO was concerned about Propulsion plant sampling. Several minutes later CO came to control and Told Eng to ensure EK ready for angles. Shortly commenced angles. XO back in control helping with guests. Looked at chart, at 1326 and GPS waypoint showed 13 miles to PH. (26 knot SOA), Informed CO. CO responded I have it under control. (73)


When completed with Angles/Rudders, overheard CO tell OOD make preps for PD, want to be at P/D in 5 minutes. Saw CO go to forward believe to Sonar. Told OOD he would go to Sonar to assist with getting a course. As went in through FWD saw CO ~~was~~ going into control from sonar. Looking at screens very hard to tell if there was anyone close ~~due to~~ ~~handwritten~~ ~~EXHIBIT~~ ~~OF~~ ~~5~~ 73

Ship was turning to 120. Believe at 150.
hooked as screen 3 ~~at~~ traces to N/NW
hooking close to see if any one was breaking.
[Believe 12, 13, 14]. Very ~~go~~ quick ~~to~~ for
CO to order ship to P/D.

Two Outer ones ^{straight up and down}, Middle one weaker
had maybe a very slight left. Not
sure if ship had been steady on a
previous course. Study real hard.

Go To STA/ITA, go to P/D. Went to
Stand at Low, saw OOD take rapid sweeps,
CO ordered 58 feet, Thought that is not
a high look, but that is the way the CO
has always done it. CO Took scope.
Hoped for chance to broach. Very short time
when CO ordered Emerging Deep ^(W400), XO wanted
a broached look - did not tell ~~to~~ CO. Attention
in control room.

Remembered Thinking we need to get right back up. Ship
Blew really quickly from going down. Prior to
~~ED the~~ Emergency Surface believes CO ~~is not~~ say
"Beary to PH" then changed course and Blew.



Surface heard two slaps, heard CO
raise ^{#2} scope saying OI, NO. Raised
#1 Scope, Arranged for DVs out of control.

Handed IMC to CO, went to Radio for comms.
Came out went back to radio with name of vessel.

Went to crews mess, swimmers are being staged for FET.
Went to Control saw gigantic waves over FET

(b)(6) with flexible ladder to bridge, told
him to go up with Eng. Made IMC
waves too rough at FET swimmers to bridge trunk.
Telling guys on scopes, find them, find them
6, 7, 8 rafts. Never saw anyone in the
water. Stayed on scopes for hours.
Divers ready and briefed if anyone seen in
water.

At one point discussed with CO Survivors
safer in rafts than try to get on board us.

OOD (LTJG COEN) honest and cautious.
OOD. He will take a while getting to P/D
if you have more than one contact.
Thinks things through.

Tran OODs per CO's standing order.
Always get two good legs. Course on
120 was probably long enough if
we had a good first leg. Thought
we had another leg coming. Trained
to use fire control system.

Look at TB Print out.

XO found out about ASVDO when underway
perhaps maneuvering watch. Just secured
power. No observed Troubleshooting, there
was a reason they could not fix it.

#1 Scope down after dark.

- 15 mes an bars
- 1245 to begu A+D
- Ford CO + some redy to go w/ A+D
- 1306 XO went into CO station - and he had to get guy ... PHE 1400

→ CO says he was caned w/ Pring Sample - did not want to do A+D dy sample

→ Sent sent Back to check a sample status (w/ M. Brant)

→ Sam after, begu A+D 30° 7↓

→ VIP's engaged to A+D - take pictures

→ 1326 XO looks @ chart - notes 13 miles away for PH

→ Wished to CO - 13 mi from PH (CO says, I know what I'm doing)

→ Cantino mae A+D

→ After A+D, CO says "COSEN - I want to be a PD in 5 min!"

→ XO tells it's very assuring NOTE

- X's notes ASDU is blank. -
- XO walked into Sam & CO was stepping out of ^{sonar} - turned door
- Tried to tell if anyone was close (cutouts)
- * here of large redder night
- Car to 120
- XO looks at screen, sees 3 trees to N-NW
- Led to see if any are breaking - look at bronze
- * CO pushed, XO: COIN really didn't fall completely cutouts
- Had 2 to left ↓ - the middle one had a slight left
- XO may not have been looking at Sam per to 120 (try to help CO)
- Did not hear, but some CO credited to PD
- At PD - watchy screens
- OOD says no clue cutouts
- OOD did sweep
- CO said go to 58

Sawyer
OP

ST3

ST1

- CO c.f. goes to SF for night look
- XO says to have a chance to branch
- XO still in Sam

Scorer
op

→ CO calls ED

STB

→ XO truly "man... I want branch / 50' or
sandy."

→ XO did not tell CO that he wanted

~~*~~ a branch look

(Seemed Fast)
CO did ED not lay off scope

ST1

→ XO takes Cartels looked the same as he

→ XO truly that we need to get right back

THRU

up

→ Went down - turned to 340° & EB

→ Note * up turn -

~~*~~ Ben new range to P44 - chye

→ came, the Blaw

→ Heard first sud - way - the second

→ CO raised #2 scope - "Oh no... OHN"

→ CO immediately gave orders to get back to
usual

→ Handled IMC to CO

→ XO ran into RADO - meets - (b)(6)

STO W
ET

→ XO goes to CONN + asks LAT/Hub

→ Did go to radio w/ msg vessel +
LAT/Hub

→ XO went to crew's mess + gets
Swimmer's staged

→ Looks to scope + sees huge wave gap
our forward escape track

→ He sends a PO up to Bridge w/
Addr (flux) to hookup.

→ XO says swimmer report to Bridge -
gets life raft then

→ Has folks count life rafts - COS takes a
tall

→ XO never saw anyone in water - only in life rafts.

→ Watched scope for hours - (looks at watch?)

→ Commanding USCG - USCG says we will
be the saw

→ CO truly abt bring them in

→ XO reminds west of USCG - to unstick to
try to get them into sub - Big Swells -

6
0

Swimmer
Op

ST3

ST1

STOW
ET



74
FACE 4

5

→ XO told CO about the shift the-
aft seal

→ COEN is honest / cautious - COD

→ He will take a while to get to PD if

the is more than an contact

→ XO trusts him - takes things slowly

→ * Ass seal other types of horned expens

→ Trow COD to get "2 good legs" - be

prepared to report Bay Ridge / Bay Roke

→ If first leg was good, then XO the

the second leg (120°) was good

* XO thought they had another leg coming *

→ thought they would move to put them a
started beam

→

→ No Improbability of ASDU (see memo that
they could not fix it

→

Unsworn Statement of LCDR Pfeifer

I have been advised by counsel not to give a sworn statement. However, I would like to provide the Court with the facts that I feel are important to the inquiry.

I first heard about a proposed Distinguished Visitor (DV) evolution sometime in January while we were in port on our last Eastern Pacific Deployment. The Navigator reported to me that the squadron had asked us to take a group of DVs out on 9 February. My understanding of our schedule at that time was that we would be in port from 5-9 February to accomplish Pre-Overseas Movement (POM) classroom training, and then underway again on Monday, 12 February to complete Operational Reactor Safeguards Examination (ORSE) preps. I thought the Commanding Officer (CO) would want to do the DV cruise so after looking at manning issues, I recommended that we accomplish both. I felt we could adequately man the boat and leave enough people ashore to benefit from the scheduled training. I do not recall the exact numerical breakdown, but it was close to: 18 men at the trainers; 8 men on leave, emergency leave, or attending formal schools; and 11 men assigned as linehandlers with special liberty. That left us with about 105 men to get underway with. The sailing list shows about 160, but 18 of these were potential gains or recent transfers who had left and were not available. I felt comfortable and still feel comfortable with that level of manning for a short underway.

The CO agreed with simultaneously supporting the DV cruise and the training. On Friday, 2 February, the squadron suggested that we go to sea during the weekend of February 10-11. After reviewing our current engineering readiness, and considering the advantages and

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disadvantages of going to sea that weekend, the COB, EDMC, Department Heads, and I recommended to the CO that we not go to sea that weekend. The CO talked to the squadron the following week and the weekend underway was cancelled. I planned the evolutions for the DV cruise based on previous experience on the USS GREENEVILLE. Some of the evolutions that we typically do on DV cruises required the CO's permission, so I got concurrence with the plan on Thursday.

The morning of 9 February, I arrived at the boat at 0500 and checked on the status of pre-underway checks. I then held a meeting in the wardroom with those people that would be directly involved with the DVs. At around 0730, I met the DVs and CAPT Brandhuber on the pier. I had reviewed the SUBPAC memorandum on the Chief of Staff's Standing Orders. I provided him with three 3x5 cards. One card listed the DVs, the second one listed the ship's officers and chiefs, and the third listed the schedule of events for the day. I also invited him to review the chart with me, but he declined. I had also previously scheduled the Engineering Duty Master Chief (EDMC) and the Chief of the Boat (COB) to seek out the Chief of Staff and offer him a tour of the ship. Below decks, we had a Welcome Aboard package prepared for CAPT Brandhuber and the other DVs that included a folder with a USS GREENEVILLE booklet, a welcome letter, and another 3x5 card that listed all the Officers and Chiefs. I do not recall when these were distributed, but my usual practice is to place the folder for the senior military rider in a rack in my stateroom, which I offered for his use. We then held the standard brief for the DVs in the crew's mess. The ship's corpsman, the ship's Public Affairs Officer (PAO), the COB, the CO and I all spoke. The Chief of Staff attended.

After reporting to the CO that we were ready to get underway, the ship got underway at around 0800. I supervised the linehandling initially and then went below to monitor the piloting. The day proceeded normally. We had 16 DVs on board so we had planned to break the lunch period in the wardroom for DVs into two groups. The lunchtime for the crew remained unchanged. The CO ate with the first group of DVs. They started at around 1045 and concluded at around 1145. I ate with the second group. My group finished at about 1245. The POD had angles and dangles commencing at 1230, so at this point we were about 15 minutes late. I went to the CO's stateroom and notified him that the wardroom dishes would be stored in 5 minutes and suggested we start angles and dangles then.

At this point the CO asked me who we had on the helm for the upcoming evolution. I looked out into Control and saw one of our less proficient helmsman, not the best choice for high speed maneuvers. I told the CO that I would get Petty Officer (b)(6) who was more proficient. Petty Officer (b)(6) relieved the helm.

While I was in the control room talking with some of the DVs, the Navigator came to me and reminded me that we had a Papa Hotel (PH) time of 1400 and that it was 1306. I went to the CO's stateroom and mentioned the time and reminded him about the Papa Hotel time. The CO was signing ship pictures at the time and I remember him saying something to the effect of "well, I guess we are going to be late." He then went back to signing pictures. I got the impression that he was not worried about the time and that it would be OK to be a little late to Papa Hotel.

ENCLOSURE

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About ten minutes later we began angles and dangles and then large rudder turns at high speed. I positioned myself just aft of #2 Scope from there I could simultaneously monitor the Ship's Control Panel and the navigation chart. As the evolution progressed, around 1326, I noted that we were 13 miles from PH. I mentioned this to the CO, thinking that he may want to cut some of the high speed rudder turns short and head back. I did not believe that there was any reason to be unnecessarily late. I reminded him because I felt it was my job as XO to keep him informed. His response was "I know what I am doing."

As we completed the angles and turns, I heard the CO tell the OOD that he wanted to be at periscope depth (PD) in five minutes. The CO then walked off the Conn. I did not notice where he was heading, but I assumed it was to his stateroom to sign more pictures. I did not understand the CO to mean that we were going to PD in five minutes no matter what, I assumed he meant that he would like the ship to complete preparations to go to PD in five minutes. He was not giving permission to go to PD, he was giving the OOD a goal. I first reviewed the chart to check our position in relation to Penguin Bank and our area boundaries. At this point, I had no idea what the contact picture was, but I knew that the AVSDU was out of commission (OOC), so I mentioned to LTJG Coen that I would help him get to PD and I headed to Sonar. At no time did anyone order me to Sonar or even suggest that I go to Sonar. I went because I was trying to help LTJG Coen compensate for the loss of the AVSDU. I viewed my role as an advisor to help determine a good course to come to PD on.

As I walked into Sonar through the forward door, I saw the CO as he walked out of Sonar through the aft door into the control room. I was surprised because I had not realized that he was

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helping LTJG Coen. I was glad that the CO was involved in the evolution, because I knew that it would be easier to meet his time goal if he was already aware of the contact picture when the OOD gave him the reports required prior to coming to PD. I saw SN [redacted] sitting at Workload Share, Petty Officer [redacted] on Primary Broadband, Petty Officer [redacted] standing over SN [redacted] (b)(6), and Petty Officer [redacted] the Sonar Supervisor. I had a brief discussion with Petty Officer [redacted] and Petty Officer [redacted] but I cannot remember what we discussed. The sonar watch section appeared to be running well. I am very comfortable with the experience level of both Petty Officer [redacted] (b)(6) and Petty Officer (b)(6). I did not know at the time that SN Rhodes was not qualified. I heard the CO order the OOD to come to course 120 through the Sonar curtain.

At this point, I remember studying the Passive Broadband display. I saw that we had been on a northerly course for a few minutes before the turn to 120, but I could not tell much from the display because on that leg we had just come out of high-speed rudder turns. I focused on the 120 leg that we were on. I saw 3 traces to the North-Northwest. I remember seeing the middle one, the faintest trace, had slight left bearing drift. I must have known at the time, but have subsequently been reminded that this was S-14. The trace on the left was S-12. The trace on the right was S-13. I could not detect any bearing drift on either S-12 or S-13. At this point I was primarily looking for any information that would indicate a close contact. I did not see any.

After a few minutes, I heard through the curtain, the CO say to LTJG Coen, "proceed to periscope depth." This surprised me because I thought we had another leg coming to assist Fire Control in getting a solution on the contacts. However, I knew we had been on the northerly leg

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and then on 120. I knew the CO and the OOD were in Control and would be working the fire control problem with the FTOW, so I figured they must have gotten enough input from the previous legs to develop solutions that they were comfortable with. I remained in Sonar because I thought I would be most useful keeping my eyes on the display as we approached PD. Normally, if I was in control on an ascent to PD, I would keep my eyes on the AVSDU. Since the AVSDU was out, I watched the display from Sonar.

As we reached PD, I looked out from Sonar and saw LTJG Coen finishing his sweeps. I heard him call "no close contacts," and then saw the CO take the scope and direct him to 58 feet. At this point, I moved from Sonar into the area in Control just on the other side of the Sonar curtain. I began to explain to some of the DVs what the next evolution would be. I did not watch the CO do his periscope sweep. Later, I heard the CO call "Emergency Deep." I looked over at him and saw that his glasses were hooked on his ears and positioned under his chin as he lowered the scope. At first I thought perhaps the CO had seen something in the scope that made him call "Emergency Deep", but when after a few seconds the CO ordered LTJG Coen to make his depth 400 feet, I realized that CO was using it as a way to get down faster. When Emergency Deep was called, I looked over to the Chief of the Watch station to ensure that he remembered to lower the masts and antennas. I heard the helm change the bell and ring up three rings directing maneuvering to answer the bell without regard to cavitation. From my vantage point, the ship's control party took all required actions for the Emergency Deep correctly.

At this point, my primary concern was getting back up to the surface quickly to ensure that the area that we had just sanitized with the scope search would remain clear. I did not want

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the DVs to prolong the process, so I watched them take their stations from where I was in front of Sonar. I was ready to intervene if they added any time to the process, but they did not. At some point, the CO asked the bearing to Papa Hotel and ordered the OOD to turn to 340.

At 400 feet we conducted the Emergency Blow. There was nothing out of the ordinary. As we came to the surface, however, I heard two thumps about a second apart. The CO raised #2 Scope. As he looked through the scope, I could tell he was in anguish. I raised #1 Scope and saw a fishing vessel aft of our ship. I assumed that we had hit it.

After the collision, I checked on and advised the CO about the material condition of the GREENEVILLE. I also helped coordinate communications, particularly radio voice and hard copy messages. I directed rescue swimmer preparations. I tried to keep the crew and the DVs informed with periodic IMC status updates. I also directed a verification of completed actions listed in applicable casualty procedures. These were completed with a few exceptions including repositioning some ventilation valves and opening the bridge upper and lower hatches to support SAR efforts.

At some point, I think CAPT Brandhuber recommended that I write down some notes about what had happened. I wrote out my notes at 1641. I have attached my notes to this statement. The purple ink writing was added at a later point and is not relevant to the statement. After recently reviewing it, I noticed the last word on the front page is "left." I meant to have completed the thought which was none were on the "left drawing right."

I also started to gather up the evidence that I thought would be necessary for the investigation. I looked through the evidence as I gathered it to verify the accuracy of the required hard copy message traffic describing the steps taken prior to the collision. I locked the evidence in my safe. On Sunday, 11 February, Commodore Byus and LCDR Harrison interviewed me and wrote a results of interview. My understanding of this interview was to ask me what I thought happened. The answers I gave during that interview were often not what I saw, felt, believed, or wanted at the time it happened, but what I knew, felt, and believed on Sunday, 11 February. What I knew, felt, and believed on Sunday was based on evaluating both what I saw at the time and what I learned later. To collide with the fishing vessel, I realized as soon as we struck it that it must have been close when we were at PD, and I knew that the periscope look must have failed to detect it. I also later assumed that the CO and OOD must not have developed an accurate contact picture prior to going to periscope depth if it was that close.

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